Adobe Reader's Custom Memory Management: a Heap of Trouble
Research and Analysis: Haifei Li
Contributor and Editor: Guillaume Lovet
a PDF-specific exploitation research
focusing on the custom heap management on Adobe Reader.
summary:
. I filed this note under adda
because that is my C code generator,
the basis of addx,
whose design includes rolling its own
heap mgt system .
. this paper was pointing out that
the modern OS has a secure heap due to
randomization -- a feature I hadn't planned
to incorporate into the addx mem system .
"(performance sometimes. if malware can overwrite your heap,
being the enemy of security,
this custom heap management system
makes it significantly easier
to exploit heap corruption flaws
in a solid and reliable way.
Coupled with the recent developments in
DEP(data execution prevention) protection bypass,
this makes heap corruption exploitation
possible across very many setups )
then it helps to have a hardened heap
(like what would typically be provided
by your platform's os).
. questions I had were
how are these happening ?
here's their skeletal answer:
"( Heap corruption flaws are initiated by. how is malware there in the first place
(Heap overflow, use after free,
integer overflow, etc...);
the two main ways to exploit these flaws:
# overwrite some app-provided data in the heap;
# corrupting Heap mgt system's internals
(eg: block headers, etc...)
so as to make the system itself
overwrite "interesting" data;
for instance, during blocks unlinking operations,
where several pointers are updated.)
waiting for a priv'escalation?
. if you prevented all these:
(Heap overflow, use after free,
integer overflow);
what else is there?
is it that functions don't check inputs?
"(many PDF vulnerabilities out there
are structure-based ones, (i.e. file format))or can malware jump in the middle of your code?
aren't you cooked already?
[11.14:
. their crashing data becomes code
because it's overwriting your code:
the heap pointers you use
for going to your own code .]
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